

































2 0 1 1 / 0 1
C O N T R I B U T I  D I  R I C E R C A  C R E N O S  
 
 
C E N T R O  R I C E R C H E  E C O N O M I C H E  N O R D  S U D  
( C R E N O S )  
U N I V E R S I T À  D I  C A G L I A R I  




I l  C R E N o S  è  u n  c e n t r o  d i  r i c e r c a  i s t i t u i t o  n e l  1 9 9 3  c h e  f a  c a p o  a l l e  U n i v e r s i t à  
d i  C a g l i a r i  e  S a s s a r i  e d  è  a t t u a l m e n t e  d i r e t t o  d a  S t e f a n o  U s a i .  I l  C R E N o S  s i  
p r o p o n e  d i  c o n t r i b u i r e  a  m i g l i o r a r e  l e  c o n o s c e n z e  s u l  d i v a r i o  e c o n o m i c o  t r a  
a r e e  i n t e g r a t e  e  d i  f o r n i r e  u t i l i  i n d i c a z i o n i  d i  i n t e r v e n t o .  P a r t i c o l a r e  a t t e n z i o n e  
è  d e d i c a t a  a l  r u o l o  s v o l t o  d a l l e  i s t i t u z i o n i ,  d a l  p r o g r e s s o  t e c n o l o g i c o  e  d a l l a  
d i f f u s i o n e  d e l l ’ i n n o v a z i o n e  n e l  p r o c e s s o  d i  c o n v e r g e n z a  o  d i v e r g e n z a  t r a  a r e e  
e c o n o m i c h e .  I l  C R E N o S  s i  p r o p o n e  i n o l t r e  d i  s t u d i a r e  l a  c o m p a t i b i l i t à  f r a  t a l i  
p r o c e s s i  e  l a  s a l v a g u a r d i a  d e l l e  r i s o r s e  a m b i e n t a l i ,  s i a  g l o b a l i  s i a  l o c a l i .   
P e r  s v o l g e r e  l a  s u a  a t t i v i t à  d i  r i c e r c a ,  i l  C R E N o S  c o l l a b o r a  c o n  c e n t r i  d i  r i c e r c a  
e  u n i v e r s i t à  n a z i o n a l i  e d  i n t e r n a z i o n a l i ;  è  a t t i v o  n e l l ’ o r g a n i z z a r e  c o n f e r e n z e  a d  
a l t o  c o n t e n u t o  s c i e n t i f i c o ,  s e m i n a r i  e  a l t r e  a t t i v i t à  d i  n a t u r a  f o r m a t i v a ;  t i e n e  
a g g i o r n a t e  u n a  s e r i e  d i  b a n c h e  d a t i  e  h a  u n a  s u a  c o l l a n a  d i  p u b b l i c a z i o n i .  
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We analyze how authorizing a new university affects welfare when the students’ 
education depends on the peer group effect. Students are horizontally differentiated 
according to their ability and the distance from the university. Comparing a 
monopolistic university with a two-universities model we find that allowing a “new” 
university is welfare improving when the monopolistic university is only attended by 
able students with less mobility constraints. This occurs when mobility costs are 
sufficiently high. When mobility costs are low, a negative externality arises and 
welfare decreases. The negative externality comes through the peer group effect: 
high ability students that would have gone to the monopolistic university go to the 
university with the lower average ability. These students end up in a university with 
students whose ability was not high enough to go to the monopolist. On the other 
hand, students remaining in the good university benefit from a lower average ability. 
Thus, a new university is welfare improving only for those with low ability that in 
the monopolistic scenario would remain unskilled. When, instead, the mobility cost 
is high, the monopolist leaves out a significative mass of individuals. In this case, no 
negative externality arises because no student swaps university therefore a "new" 
university is welfare improving. However, this welfare improvement makes the 
opportunities for a higher education less equal (according to Romer, 1998) because 
an "external circumstance" like mobility cost, rather than own ability, becomes the 
main determinant of the students’ human capital. 
 
Keywords: peer group quality, mobility costs, universities. 
Jel Classification: I21, I23. 
 
* We wish to thank Luca Deidda, Gianni De Fraja, Fausto Galli, Tito Pietra, Pierre 
Pestieau and Vincenzo Scoppa for their helpful comments. The second author 
acknowledges the financial support of MIUR-PRIN 2008 and Fondazione Banco di 
Sardegna. The first author thanks the "Visiting Professor Program" at the University of 
Sassari (CRENoS and DEIR). 
1 Introduction
Empirical evidence conrms a proliferation of universities in Europe.1 Widening
higher education participation, for instance, is one of the main points of the UK
governments agenda. The recent publication of A Challenge to University"
highlights the development of local higher education as a strategy to increase
higher education participation to those who would be usually excluded. This
o¢ cial document explains that the UK governments strategy aims to create up
to 20 new centers of higher education (HE) by 2014. Such a policy is based
on the empirical evidence that geographical distance and peer group quality
are relevant in determining higher education participation. If distance is one
of the main barriers to participation, on the other hand the peer group quality
strengths participation in higher education. As largely shown for compulsory
education, also university students achieve a higher human capital when attend-
ing an institution with a high average quality.
We study the implications of introducing a "new" university in a model in
which students are uniformly distributed according to their ability and mobil-
ity costs. We compare a monopolistic university scenario with a two-university
model (free for all) in which a students human capital positively depends on
own ability and the average ability, that is endogenously determined by stu-
dentssorting. We nd that the monopolistic university is characterized by a
higher average ability (but a lower participation). When a new university is
introduced, and the mobility costs are low, a negative externality arises through
the peer group e¤ect: high ability students, that would have gone to the mo-
nopolistic university, go to the new university with a lower average ability.
These students end up at the university with those whose ability was not high
enough to go to the monopolist. On the other hand, students remaining in the
good university now receive a lower average ability. In this scenario, the new
university is welfare improving only for the low ability students that otherwise
would have remained unskilled whereas now can a¤ord the newinstitution in
a two-university model.
This externality does not arise when the mobility cost is su¢ ciently high. In
this second scenario, only able students go to the good monopolistic institution
and none prefer to switch to a new bad university, therefore no negative exter-
nality arises. The e¤ect of a new university is simply that of allowing students
close to the bad university to be skilled. Thus, introducing a university does not
a¤ect the peer group quality within the good university (monopolistic or not)
that, in turn, appears as an elite institution attended only by able students
with lower mobility costs. These "elite" students are una¤ected, while the wel-
fare improvement comes from less able students with more mobility constraints
who are strictly better o¤. A new university also a¤ects the equality of oppor-
tunities that, according to Romer (1998), should occur when the future income
1 In a recent empirical study Daraio et al. (2010) nd that the number of universities
shows an acceleration after 1970 in Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland and the UK. This phenomenon is strong in Italy where
27 universities have been created between 1982 and 2004.
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only depends on students ability and not on other "external" factors. In our
simple framework, the future income is the students education while the exter-
nal factor is the mobility cost. Interestingly, we nd that, when transportation
cost are high, introducing a university, thought welfare improving, makes the
mobility cost the main determinant of the students sorting and therefore of
their future income.
Our paper is in line with Del Rey (2001), Gautier and Wauthy (2007) and De
Fraja and Iossa (2002). The rst three papers consider universities competing
in teaching and research activities. Our is however closer to De Fraja and Iossa
(2002), who, focusing on distance and studentsability, nd that high mobility
costs lead to the arise of an eliteinstitution.2
Our paper is clearly based on two main empirical results: i) the existence of
the peer group e¤ect in higher education, and ii) the e¤ect of geographic distance
on the higher education participation. Empirical evidence conrms that peer
quality a¤ects the students performance at the higher education level in the
US (Sacerdote (2001), Zimmerman (2003), Arcidiacono and Nicholson (2005),
Hoxby and Weingarth (2005), Aricidiacono et al. (2010)), in Italy (De Giorgi,
Pellizzari and Redaelli (2006) and Brunello, De Paola and Scoppa (2010)), in
China (Ding and Lehrer (2007)) and in South Korea (Kang (2007)).
The relevant e¤ect of the geographical distance has been recently conrmed
by Frenette (2004, 2006 and 2009), Sà et al. (2006), Gibbons and Vignoles
(2009), Speiss and Wrohlich (2010) and Kenyon (2010). Kenyon (2010) analyzes
the UK governments strategy in "A challenge to University" and conrms that
a strategy targeted to the transport cost may be signicant in increasing the
participation of the under-represented groups in the higher education. Frenette
(2009) shows that the creation of a local university in Canada, is associated with
a large increase in university attendance among local youth in each a¤ected city.
Speiss and Wrohlich (2010) nd that in Germany an increase in the distance
between home and university is associated with a lower participation in higher
education. Gibbons and Vignoles (2009) show that in Britain distance is the
strongest factor inuencing university choice among those who participate.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model. Sections 3
analyzes the case with a monopolistic university while in Section 4 we introduce
another university. Section 5 caracterizes the equilibria and studies the welfare
implications. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
We consider two universities j = A;B operating in the same jurisdiction. Each
of them producesgraduates. We assume a horizontally di¤erentiated model
over a line [0; 1]. Let university A be placed at x = 0 and university B at x = 1.3
2See also Grazzini et al. (2010) for a recent analysis.
3Locating the rm A at x = 0 is an innocuous assumption because, as it will be clear in
what follows, locating the monopolistic rm at x = 1 will give the same qualitative results.
3
2.1 The students
We use a spatial competition model to describe the studentsbehavior. Students
are distributed in a two-dimensional space: each student, i, is characterized by
her address, x, along the line [0; 1] that separates the two universities, and by
her initial ability i. We assume for simplicity that i and xi are uniformly
and independently distributed on [0; 1]  [0; 1]. A student located at x faces a
mobility cost tx if attending University A and t (1  x) if attending University
B. Total population of students is normalized to one.







where j measures the peer group e¤ect, the average ability at the university
j. This human capital function is in line with the common assumptions in liter-
ature such as eii > 0, eij > 0 and eiji > 0. The rst is largely accepted. The
second conrms the presence of the peer group e¤ect: human capital increases
in the average ability of the university. The positive cross derivative in the last
term implies that the peer e¤ect becomes more e¤ective in the production of
human capital as the level of innate ability increases, or in other words a higher
peer-group e¤ect benets more high ability students. This assumption follows
Epple and Romano (2008) and is in line with the empirical evidence in Hoxby
and Weingarth (2005), Ding and Lehrer (2007), Kang (2007) and Brunello, De
Paola and Scoppa (2010) nding that the peer e¤ect of good peers rises along
the ability distribution.4
The labour market is over simplied. We assume that wage is equal to the
human capital. We denote  (i) as the probability of completing the university.
With probability 1   (i) the student drops out. In case of drop out he does
not benet from the peer group e¤ect therefore his wage is equal to the unskilled
students wage. The utility for each student i enrolled at university j is:






+ (1   (i)) i (2)
The human capital production function (1) implies that the utility function
satises the following properties: i) U > 0, ii) U > 0 and iii) U > 0.
Since each student faces the same per-unit transportation cost equal to t,
the net utility for the student i enrolled at the university j is:
Ui   tbxj (3)
with bxj = fx; 1  xg according to which university he is enrolled at.
4Hoxby and Weingarth (2005) in particular nd a positive cross derivative when having
higher ability peers, whereas a weak e¤ect is found with peers of similar abilities. For the
Italian case, Brunello, De Paola and Scoppa (2010) prove that peer e¤ects are positive and
statistically signicant for students enrolled in engineering, math and natural science and
close to zero in the humanities. Less recent evidence is also provided by Sacerdote (2001) and
Zimmerman (2003).
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Trasportation costs are one of the main economic constraints for student at-
tending university. Some universities, in fact, include these costs for the purpose
of determining the full cost of attendance and eligibility for nancial aid.
The student i not attending the university is denoted by u (unskilled) and
he receives a wage equal to his human capital, his utility is simply:
Ui;u = i (4)
We keep the labour market as simple as possible because we aim at focus-
ing on the e¤ect of the transportation cost and the peer group e¤ect. In our
model the net utility for the skilled workers is higher, but it does not imply, ex
ante, that the gross utility (included the transportation cost) is higher than the
utility of being unskilled. Students, in fact, can go to the university (paying
the transportation cost) but then drop out. In this easy interpretation higher
education is a risky investment. To ease the computational tractability of the
model we simplify the probability of getting the degree as follows.
Assumption 1  (i) = i, for every i 2 [0; 1], with  (0) = 0 and  (1) = 1.
The probability of getting the degree (a higher wage) increasing in the innate
ability is largerly used in literature.
3 Monopolistic University
In this section we study the scenario with only one university, A, called here
monopolistic university. Lets assume that it is located at x = 0. In this scenario
each student can only choose between going to the monopolistic university or
being unskilled. Hence, a student i located in xi will go to the monopolistic
university A if:








+ (1   (i)) i   tx  i (6)
where M is the peer group e¤ect (average ability) at this university. It
is possible to show that there exist innite pairs x;  such that a student is
indi¤erent between going to the monopolistic university and being unskilled.















the slope is clearly positive.5





> 0) then we have that students with higher ability go to the monop-
olistic university. The single crossing property says that the marginal increase
in human capital due to a higher ability is higher in the presence of the peer
group.
To simplify the notation we denote the indi¤erence locus simply by xM and
for further purposes we graphically represent it in Fig 1. We have that the
intercepts have the following coordinates: 1)  = 0; xM = 0, and 2)  = 1;
xM = Mt with x
M T 1 if M T t. The area C, above the locus, is the mass of
individuals going to the university, whereas the area E, below the locus, is the
mass of those preferring to be unskilled. Fig. 1 explains that the higher the
transportation cost the smaller the mass of university students. In other words,
when the e¤ect of the transportation cost dominates the benet from the peer
group e¤ect, then mass of students deciding to remain unskilled gets bigger.6
4 Two University model
We now introduce the university (B), located at x = 1. We dene the marginal










> 0 is dM
d
> 0, that holds given the
endogeneity of the peer group that is clearly increasing in the ability.
6 If the monopolistic university was located in x = 1, the indi¤erence focus would be exM =
1  2M+
t
that, by symmetry, is downward sloping in , with the intercept xM ( = 1) 7 0
if t 7 M + 1. All higher ability students keep going to the monopolist.
6
student, denoted by exi (), is dened by the following identity:







+ (1  )    tex () =     1 + B+ (1  )    t (1  ex) (10)
That, after same simplications, gives:






Consider the case A   B > 0. Our assumption @e@j@ > 0 (equivalent to
@Uji
@j@
> 0) implies that high ability students are better o¤ at the university
with the higher peer group e¤ect, thus A   B > 0 (given the endogeneity
of the average ability) clearly implies that the high ability students go to the
university A. In fact, given A   B > 0 the slope of the locus, in , is positive
with the following intercepts: 1)  = 1; ex > 12 and 2)  = 0; ex = 12 . In particular,ex T 1 when t Q  A   B. 7 See Fig 2 for the cases t < A B and t > A B .
The transportation cost t is the "marginal" cost faced when moving toward the
good university (or the monopolistic university) while A B is the "marginal"
benet the individual with ability  obtains from a higher peer group e¤ect.
The area C above the locus is the mass of students preferring the university
A whereas the the area E below the locus is the mass of student preferring B.
When the transportation cost dominates the benet from switching university
B with A (leading to a higher peer group e¤ect) the mass of student preferring
the worse university (B) gets bigger. A student living close to the new university
(B) prefers the better university (A) only if his ability is su¢ ciently high.8
So far we have simply specied which university the student would prefer
if he had the option to choose between A and B. Nevertheless, we need to
introduce the mass of student who prefer remaining unskilled rather than going
to any university. We found then the loci such that students are indi¤erent
between going to university (whatever it is) or being unskilled. Let us to denoteexB;u and exA;u the indi¤erence loci between the university (B or A) and being




















that, under A   B > 0, is downward sloping as the locus for
the monopolistic scenario. High ability students keep going to the university A and we obtain
the same qualitative results of the case in which university A is located at x = 0.
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that gives:
exB;u  1  2B
t
(13)
The Fig. 3 illustrates this locus.
Given the intercepts, 1)  = 0,exB;u = 1, and 2)  = 1, exB;u = 1  Bt < 1, the
slope is negative d
eB;u
dx < 0. This still means (for the same reasoning above) that
the high ability student prefers B (area B) rather than being unskilled (area
U). Also, the slope is increasing in t with the locus getting steeper the lower
is t. In particular, when  = 1 and t = B then exB;u = 0; in other words the
locus is orthogonal to the horizontal axis and the slope is zero. This implies that
when the transportation cost exactly overcomes the benet from attending the
university B, nobody goes to the university. Only students living in the same
location as the university (along the locus) are indi¤erent between going and
staying put. When instead t = 0, the slope is innite and the locus coincides
with the horizontal axis, this implies that all students go to the university.
The locus exA;u is obtained from the locus xM , by construction they coincide
up to the point in which xM crosses the locus ex (). This leads to the following
Corollary, that will be useful in the rest of the paper.
Corollary 1 A < M .
Proof. The monopolistic rm is located at x = 0, then the locus exA;u is a
function exA;u  xM up to the crossing point with ex. Since ex is stepper than xM
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and the lowest ability necessary to go to the monopolistic university increases
in the distance x, there exists a part of high ability students relatively closer
to x = 1 that leaves the monopolist when the university B is introduced. The
monopolistic university faces a drop in the high ability students, this implies
that A < M .
The Corollary 1 says that, in our scenario, the monopolistic university guar-
antees a higher average ability because it enrolls also the mass of high ability
students that in a two university model are below ex and prefers university B
to A. Fig. 4 illustrates this point. The U area is the mass of student below
both exA;u and exB;u that prefers remaining unskilled basically for two reasons:
they are too far from both universities and their ability is not high enough to
o¤set the transportation cost. Area B is the mass of students that goes to the
worse university (B), while A is the mass attending the (better) university A.
Students close to the university B go to the university A only if su¢ ciently able.
The triangular area below exA;u  xM but above xM is the mass of student with
a relative high ability that in a monopolistic scenario would go to the monop-
olistic university, whereas, in a two-university scenario, go to the university B
(the bad one) because it is closer.
5 Characterizing equilibria and welfare analysis
The possible equilibria depend on t; A B and .9In this section we study the
welfare e¤ect of introducing a new university and nd the equilibria in which a
new university is unambiguously welfare decreasing or enhancing.
9We remind that A > B . The model is perfectly symmetric and the opposite results
hold when A < B .
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Proposition 2 When i) t  A B ; t < M , and ii) t > A B, t  M a new
university is unambiguously welfare reducing. For any t satisfying t > A   B
and t > M , a new university is welfare increasing when t > A + B.
Proof. See Appendix.
The result in Proposition 2 shows that when the mobility cost is su¢ ciently
low, there exists a negative externality due to some high ability students pre-
ferring the bad institution in a two-university scenario (See Fig 5), although
they would have chosen the good monopolistic university. All students above
the monopolistic locus (the dashed line partially overlapping with exA;u) would
go to the monopolistic university.
The red line is the mass of individuals who are indi¤erent between B and
being unskilled, while the upward sloping line (ex), crossing the red line, is the
indi¤erence locus between A and B. Once a new university (B in our case) is
introduced, high ability students relatively closer to the location x = 0 go to
the university A (students in the top left area A) whereas students in the right
area (area B) will choose university B because it is relatively closer.
The area B below the monopolistic locus (excluded the triangle below xM
but above the dashed line) represents those students who with only one univer-
sity would have remained unskilled, but in a two-university model can a¤ord the
university B. The bottom irregular triangle U includes students that remain
unskilled as under monopoly as well as in a two-university scenario.
Students going to A (and previously going to the monopolistic university)
are worse o¤ because the average ability (peer group e¤ect) they receive is now
lower. This reduction is due to the fact that some high ability students now
prefer B. These students are located in the top part of the area B (triangle
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below ex but above the dashed line) and are worse o¤ because they now share
the university with the low ability students that, absent the second university,
would have remained unskilled. Students in the remaining part of the area B
are better o¤ because now they can be skilled. Students in the bottom triangle
U are indi¤erent because they dont go to the university at all.
Under t  A  B and t < M the mass of worse o¤ students is higher than
the mass of better o¤ students10 . Furthermore, by condition U > 0 we know
that the impact of a higher peer group e¤ect is stronger (in negative or positive
sense) for the students with the higher ability. This equivalently implies that
a reduction in the utility due to a lower peer group is stronger for the student
with the higher ability (in the area A) or, in other words, the aggregate marginal
benet (for the students that are better o¤) is lower than the aggregate marginal
loss (for the students that are worse o¤). This, together with transportation
cost incurred by students in B, implies that a new university is welfare reducing.
The negative externality disappears when the transportation costs are su¢ -
ciently high, therefore a welfare improvement occurs. See the Figure 6.
Areas A, B, U are the mass of students going respectively to university
A, B and being unskilled. The dashed line represents the overlapping loci
for the monopolistic university and the university A in a two-university model.
When the mobility cost is su¢ ciently high, a signicant mass of students remain
unskilled under a monopoly because the mobility cost overcomes the benet
from attending the university. When the new university is introduced, all the
students that would have gone to the monopolist now go to the good university
A, while the new (bad university) is only a way for low ability students (living
far from the monopolist) to a¤ord education (even though of a lower quality).
In this scenario, no students previously choosing the monopolistic university
10See the proof of the Proposition 2 for the details.
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chooses the new one, therefore the negative externality disappears.
It is straightforward to see that this scenario in which a new university is
welfare increasing, it also reduces the equality of the opportunities (EO) that,
according to Romer (1998), occurs when the expected income (that in our simple
case is the education) depends only on the ability and not on the transportation
cost (the so called "external circumstances" by Romer). Under perfect equal
opportunity students should sort across universities only according to their abil-
ity. In our model, a perfect equality of opportunities would imply horizontal
indi¤erence loci. Since, under high transportation cost, the indi¤erence locus
between the university A and B is steeper than the indi¤erence locus for the
monopolistic university, we can conclude that a new university makes the op-
portunities more unequal. In other words, when transportation costs are high
a new university is welfare improving but the transportation costs, rather than
ability, becomes the main driver for the studentssorting.
6 Main conclusions
This paper starts from two recent empirical evidences: i) peer group e¤ect in
the higher education, and ii) the proliferation of universities. We link these two
results and theoretically investigate the e¤ect of a new university when the peer
group e¤ect inuences the educational achievement and students choose univer-
sities according to their ability and mobility costs. Comparing a monopolistic
system with a two-university scenario in which universities di¤er in their average
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(endogenous) ability we found that introducing one more university decreases
the welfare when the mobility costs are low whereas it is welfare enanching in
the presence of high mobility costs.
When the mobility cost is su¤ciently low, a new university widens parte-
cipation to higher education also to those students that would have remained
unskilled in a single-university scenario. Nevertheless, some able students living
far from the good university (that would have gone to the monopolist) prefer
the new closer university (thought with a lower average ability). This sorting
induces a negative externality working through the peer group e¤ect: high abil-
ity students remaining in the good university receive a lower average ability.
Also, high ability students leaving the monopolist for the new university ben-
et from a lower average ability because they share the same university with
less able students that, without the new university, would have remained un-
skilled. When the transportation cost is high, this externality disappears and
a new university is welfare enanching. When the monopolistic university has
also the higher average ability in the two-university system, then such univer-
sity appears as an elite institution because it is attended only by able students
without mobility constraints. A new university (though with a lower peer group
quality) does not induce elite students to switch, but it simply allows less able
students with more mobility constraints to be skilled. Elite students are unaf-
fected while, on the other hand, a mass of less able students with more mobility
constraints are strictly better o¤. However, we nd that a welfare improvement
induces more unequal opportunities because an "external circumstamce" (see
Romer ,1998) like the mobility cost, rather than the own ability, becomes the
main determinant of the studentshuman capital.
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7 Appendix
Proof of the Proposition 2
We start by excluding the following four cases: 1) t > M ; t = A  B , and
2) t < A   B ; t = M , 3) t = M ; t = A   B , 4) t < A   B ; t > M . In
cases 1)-2)-4) xM and ex do not cross, then we have xM  exA;u that implies
A = M . This equality is in contradiction with the range of t in 1), 2) and
4). See Fig. 5 for the intuition. Case 3) is excluded for a similar argument
in the previous points. In fact, xM and ex cross only at  = x = 1, then we
still have xM  exA;u, still implying A = M , that is again a contradiction.
The reasonable equilibria are only three: 5) t < M ; t  A   B , 6) t  M ;
t > A   B , and 7) t > M ; t > A   B . Equilibrium 5). a) Consider
t < M ; t = A  B . In this case xM and ex cross (ex crosses the vertical axis at
 = 1 and x = 1) then xM 6= exA;u and A 6= M . See Fig 6. The area A above
xM and above the upper right part of ex is the mass of student going to A in
a two university model (the mass going to the monopolist is all the area above
xM ). The area B is the mass of student going to B, this area also includes
the right upper part just below ex and above the dashed line. The irregular
bottom triangular area U is the mass of unskilled. In this equilibrium the new
university is welfare reducing because more than half population is worse o¤
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when switching to a two-university model. There exists, in fact, a mass of high
ability students (the upper right triangle below ex and above the dashed line)
previously going to the monopolist, that in a two university model goes to the
bad university. This moving induces a negative externality for the students
still going to the good university (via a lower average ability). On the other
hand, the mass of students better o¤ is only the area B (excluded the upper
right part above the dashed line) that however is clearly smaller than the sum
between the area A and the upper right triangular area. This point together
with assumption U > 0 is a su¢ cient condition for having a welfare reduction
after the introduction of the university B. b) Consider t < M ; t < A   B .
In this case it is possible to show that xM and ex cross at a pair  < 1; x < 1,
with the exact distance given by xM = ex < 1, where in particular, xM = ex
if n = 
q
t








2M (A B) . Now by Corollary 1 (saying that
A  M ) the denominator is positive and we obtain that M2M (A B) < 1
if M   A + B > 0, that holds. This ensures that a crossing point in this
equilibria is at a pair  < 1; x < 1, therefore the argument in the point a)
(according to which most of the individuals are worse o¤ in a two university
model) holds also here. Hence, under t < M ; t < A   B a new university
cannot be welfare improving. Clearly the possible values of the mobility cost
with respect to B could be t R B . It is possible to see that the way of this
inequality does not a¤ect the conclusion in terms of welfare. Hence equilibrium
5) is welfare reducing. Equilibrium 6). Case a) t < M ; t > A   B . Even
in this case xM and ex cross at a pair  < 1; x < 1 and all the arguments in the
previous points hold, then most of the individuals are worse o¤. The same in
case b) t = M ; t > A B . In point b) the intercept of the monopolistic locus
at  = 1 is xM (1) = 1; this means that the locus is a 45 line. However the same
arguments above about the higher utility loss for high ability students in A and
B due to U > 0 still hold. Hence, under equilibrium 6) a new university is
welfare reducing. Equilibrium 7). Given the range t > A B and t > M , it
is possible to show that a new university is welfare increasing when t > A+B .
This proof essentially follows the arguments in the previous points. See the
Fig. 7. The su¢ cient condition to eliminate the negative externality is that
xM and ex do not cross in the range in which ; x 2 [0; 1], or equivalently they
cross at a positive level of ability n > 1. If this holds, then the previous
arguments in the proof and the assumption U > 0 hold also here and are
enough to show the result. xM and ex cross at a positive level of ability n > 1








2M (A B) ). However, if the two loci cross at an ability higher than
1, then the indi¤erence locus for the monopolist overlaps with the indi¤erence
locus between going to A and being unskilled (exA;u  xM ), therefore this still
implies M = A. Since n = 
q
t
2M (A B) > 1 if A+ B < t we conclude
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that a welfare increase is possible if A + B < t ( or in other words, xM andex cross at a  > 1). Clearly A + B < t is respected when t > A   B and
t > M . Furthermore t > B implies that exB;u > 0 at  = 1.
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